Indicative Conditionals and Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic can be used to give a simple, complete axiomatization of Yalcin's [16] semantic consequence relation for a language with epistemic modals and indicative conditionals. In the other direction, the formal semantics for indicative conditionals due to Kolodny and MacFarlane [9] gives rise to a new dynamic operator that is very natural from the point of view of dynamic epistemic logic, allowing succinct expression of dependence (as in dependence logic) or supervenience statements. We prove decidability for the logic with epistemic modals and Kolodny and MacFarlane's indicative conditional via a full and faithful computable translation from their logic to the modal logic K45.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825

Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence

If someone knows something then there is something in virtue of which she knows it; and if someone justifiably believes something then there is something in virtue of which she is justified in believing it. That much is relatively uncontroversial. Only slightly more controversial is the claim that our having an epistemic achievement, such as knowing something or being justified in believing something, depends on how we are in non-epistemic respects. That is, our instantiating of epistemic properties depends on our instantiating non-epistemic properties. In this paper, I argue that epistemic/non-epistemic dependence should be given a central place in epistemology, and that doing so has significant consequences

A formal analysis of the notion of preference between deductive arguments

In the last two decades, justification logic has addressed the problem of including justifications into the field of epistemic logic. Nevertheless, there is something that has not received enough attention yet: how epistemic agents might prefer certain justifications to others, in order to have better pieces of evidence to support a particular belief. In this work, we study the notion of preference between a particular kind of justifications: deductive arguments. For doing so, we have built a logic using tools from epistemic logic, justification logic and logics for belief dependence. According to our solution, the preferences of an epistemic agent between different deductive arguments can be reduced to other notions

Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement

Intellectual autonomy has long been identified as an epistemic virtue, one that has been championed influentially by (among others) Kant, Hume and Emerson. Manifesting intellectual autonomy, at least, in a virtuous way, does not require that we form our beliefs in cognitive isolation. Rather, as Roberts and Wood (Intellectual virtues: an essay in regulative epistemology, OUP Oxford, Oxford, pp. 259–260, 2007) note, intellectually virtuous autonomy involves reliance and outsourcing (e.g., on other individuals, technology, medicine, etc.) to an appropriate extent, while at the same time maintaining intellectual self-direction. In this essay, I want to investigate the ramifications for intellectual autonomy of a particular kind of epistemic dependence: cognitive enhancement. Cognitive enhancements (as opposed to therapeutic cognitive improvements) involve the use of technology and medicine to improve cognitive capacities in healthy individuals, through mechanisms ranging from smart drugs to brain-computer interfaces. With reference to case studies in bioethics, as well as the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, it is shown that epistemic dependence, in this extreme form, poses a prima facie threat to the retention of intellectual autonomy, specifically, by threatening to undermine our intellectual self-direction. My aim will be to show why certain kinds of cognitive enhancements are subject to this objection from self-direction, while others are not. Once this is established, we’ll see that even some extreme kinds of cognitive enhancement might be not merely compatible with, but constitutive of, virtuous intellectual autonomy

Epistemic Logic with Partial Dependency Operator

In this paper, we introduce $\textit{partial}$ dependency modality $\mathcal{D}$ into epistemic logic so as to reason about $\textit{partial}$ dependency relationship in Kripke models. The resulted dependence epistemic logic possesses decent expressivity and beautiful properties. Several interesting examples are provided, which highlight this logic's practical usage. The logic's bisimulation is then discussed, and we give a sound and strongly complete axiomatization for a sub-language of the logic

The social transmission of knowledge at the University: Teaching style and epistemic dependence

It is argued that an epistemic authority would induce greater influence in transmitting knowledge to students when there is a correspondence between the (authoritarian vs. democratic) style of the authority and students' perceptions of their relation to the authority (high vs. low epistemic dependence). In two studies it was predicted, and found, that students who perceived themselves in a state of low epistemic dependence towards their teachers were more influenced by a democratic than by an authoritarian teaching style. This difference in appropriation was not found for students who perceived themselves in a state of epistemic dependence towards the epistemic authorit

Knowing with Experts: Contextual Knowledge in and Around Science

The original concept of epistemic dependence suggests uncritical deference to expert opinions for non-experts. In the light of recent work in science studies, however, the actual situation of epistemic dependence is seen to involve the necessary and ubiquitous need for lay evaluations of scientific experts. As expert knowledge means restricted cognitive access to some epistemic domain, lay evaluations of expert knowledge are rational and informed only when the criteria used by non-experts when judging experts are different from the criteria used by experts when making their claims. The distinction between ‘substantial knowledge’ and ‘contextual knowledge’ allows for the laypeople to know with experts without having to know precisely what experts know. Such meta-expert evaluations are not specific to the public sphere outside science, nor are they limited internally to science, but they are present in a wide range of contexts in and around science. The paper legitimizes the concept of contextual knowledge by relating it to the relevant literature, and expounds the idea by identifying some elements of such a knowledge

Epistemic constraint and teaching style

An experimental study investigated the influence of informational dependence on information appropriation as a function of epistemic authority's styles. In a 2×2 design, university students were informed that acknowledging epistemic dependence was related either to academic success or to academic failure, and were exposed to controversial information from an epistemic authority that used either an authoritarian or a democratic style. The main dependent variable was the extent to which participants appropriated the controversial information. Firstly the results showed that students were more inclined to admit that their own academic competence depended on the information delivered by the teachers when epistemic dependence was related to success rather than to failure. Secondly, the admittance of dependence had a different impact on information appropriation according to the authority's style. Admittance increased appropriation under a democratic style whereas it decreased appropriation under an authoritarian styl

Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?

trust, testimonial knowledge, authority, epistemic dependenceAlthough there is widespread agreement that our epistemic dependence on other people's knowledge is a key ingredient of our cognitive life, the role of trust in this dependence is much more open to debate. Is trust in epistemic authority—or “epistemic trust” for short—an epistemological notion in any sense, or is it simply a bridge-concept that connects our epistemological concerns to moral issues? Should we depict it in terms of the more familiar sociological notion of trust as a basis for cooperation